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INTERNAL WEALTH TRANSFERS AND 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS 
Ljubo Sire 
Just before he so unfortunately died, Toussaint Hocevar wrote to me about how to 
calculate the transfer of wealth from Slovenia to other parts of Yugoslavia on the basis of 
balance of payments statistics. The paper in which he attempted to establish at least some 
relevant figures was read at the Third World Congress of Soviet and East European Studies 
at Washington in 1985. I 
Here I must forego the wish to work out what the actual transfer of wealth amounted 
to, because I have no access to the figures; but I intend to discuss why and how a transfer 
of this nature comes about, if it does. Nonetheless I shall first summarize what Hocevar 
actually said. According to the Ljubljana data he used, in 1980 the Slovene current account 
surplus trade of goods and services with other Yugoslav republics amounted to 53.8 billion2 
dinars, equal to 21 % of the Slovene Gross Social Product [GSP] , while with respect to trade 
with the rest of the world Slovenia had a deficit of 17.1 billion dinars, equal to 6.7% of 
its GSP. The overall Slovene surplus in 1980 was consequently 36.7 billion dinars, i.e., 
14.3% of the Slovene GSP. If these figures were true in their entirety, the discontent in 
Slovenia regarding its position in the Yugoslav economy would obviously be justified. 
The first reservation that has to be made concerns foreign trade statistics, which are 
limited to trade in goods, while the Yugoslav foreign service accounts by republics do not 
seem to be known. Since these accounts include the net inflow from tourism and the net 
transfers by guest workers, amounting together to almost 80 billion dinars, they cannot 
simply be ignored, in particular because Slovenia is not a leading recipient in these two 
respects. On the other hand it is true that, regardless of the statistics of the foreign current 
amount, the Slovene surplus with the rest of Yugoslavia is what it is-unless, of course, 
other republics use part of their receipts from abroad to pay for Slovene goods and services. 
Hocevar supported the conclusion that Slovenia transferred a considerable portion of its 
products to other Yugoslav republics without a worthwhile quid pro quo, by figures 
showing that the increase in cash balances owned by Slovene individuals, enterprises and 
institutions is approximately the same as the overall Slovene surplus with other Yugoslav 
republics. I am afraid that this identity must be considered purely coincidental: first, the 
overall deficit is not final because, as pointed out above, the exchange of services with 
foreign countries is not included; second, it cannot be assumed that the whole increase in 
cash balances in Slovenia is due to the transfer of cash balances from other republics. 
Hocevar wrote to me in January 1987 as follows: 
"Regarding the money supply in Slovenia, it is my view that it corresponds to 
the fast rise of the money income. This relationship may be even lower than in 
the South because of the greater efficiency of the Slovene banking system. In 
Slovenia the rise in the money surplus is due to real transfers, that is, to the 
surplus in the trade with other republics, while these latter acquire their increased 
money supply in the form of credits from the central bank. There is an analogy 
between Slovenia and West European countries which, in the 1960s, 
accumulated dollar reserves by means of trade surpluses. Over the last few years, 
the United States has been covering its foreign deficit by foreign indebtedness. 
Of course, this kind of claims on the whole preserve their value while Slovene 
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dinar claims-made worse by the absence of interests-are being eroded by 
inflation. Consequently unilateral transfusions occur in reality. If this did not 
apply, Slovenia could force the South to tighten the belt in the same manner as 
governments with foreign currency denominated claims can force Yugoslavia to 
do so. There is talk about indexation but indexation could be effective 
exclusively if it applied to all financial assets, i.e., also to the trade credits and 
central bank credits." 
We must analyze Hocevar's thoughts because it would be useful to clarify the economic 
relationships in Yugoslavia, both to assess the Slovene position within the country sine ira 
et studio and to work out a starting-point for possible requests as to how inter-republic trade 
should be reformed. Of course I do not pretend to know the answers, not being in 
possession of the requisite data, but I wish to indicate in which directions we have to search. 
As a beginning, the Slovene current balance should be calculated with greater precision. 
The figures have little value as long as the important sector that comprises exchange of 
services with foreign countries is left out. If data are not available, estimates are needed; 
but, naturally, the basis for the evaluation has to be clearly spelled out. 
After the full Slovene balance on the current account has been drafted, the financial side 
must be at least outlined. To rely on the increase in the supply of money is both too little 
and too much. 
It is too little, because real transfers can occur without any increase in the supply of 
money. Payments of contributions to the central government and the extension of monetary 
credits take the form of, first, a transfer of cash balances to the central government or to 
the debtor and, later, a return of these cash balances into Slovene hands when they are used 
to buy goods or services in Slovenia. On the other hand, trade credits granted by Slovene 
firms do not even appear in the bank accounts, but only establish a legal relationship 
between a Slovene firm and a non-Slovene debtor. 
In contrast, it is also too much, because the figures indicating an increase in the money 
supply overstate the real transfer, in that Slovene political authorities, banks, firms, etc. 
indubitably also have recourse-as matters stand at present-to direct borrowing from the 
central bank, so that in many instances they need not transfer any goods or services to 
obtain cash balances. With this borrowing, they also contribute to the erosion of the value 
of money, and hence to the erosion of all those who hold financial claims. It would also 
be necessary to work out the figures indicating the inter-republic relations in this respect. 
If, in the end, it were found that Slovenia does sell goods and services to other parts of 
Yugoslavia for cash which it then holds instead of using for its own purchases, the question 
would arise why this should be so. As Hocevar explains it, there would in this case be an 
analogy between the acquisition of dinar cash balances by Slovenia as a counterpart to a 
portion of its excess of exports of goods and services to the rest of Yugoslavia over its 
imports therefrom, and the acquisition of dollar balances by the Federal Republic of 
Germany in its trade with the United States of America. The crucial differences would be, 
of course, that the Federal Republic acquires a foreign currency, whereas Slovenia receives 
domestic currency which cannot be easily distinguished from the domestic currency 
acquired in other ways. Of course Slovenia, or rather Slovene individuals, can also obtain 
foreign currency in their dealings with other parts of Yugoslavia, for the simple reason that 
the inflow of foreign currency into, e.g., Croatia or Bosnia, on the basis of tourism or guest 
workers' tranfers, is considerable. But figures about these transactions are impossible to 
come by because these transactions are illegal, although everybody knows that they take 
place to an important extent. Of course nobody in Slovenia complains if they are paid in, 
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say, Deutschmarks for their goods and services, or simply for their dinars, even though 
they may hold on to these marks for quite some time. 
When Hocevar mentions dollar balances acquired by the Federal Republic of Germany 
in its dealings with the United States, he has official German currency reserves in mind. 
But many more dollar balances are held by private German firms and German citizens-
even though it is certain that the dollar has been losing its purchasing power much faster 
than the German mark. Private firms and citizens may wish to hold dollars because they 
believe that the higher interest rates they earn on dollar balances compensates them for the 
loss of value; or they may simply hold them for convenience, since dollars are still very 
clearly a "trade currency." On the other hand, the reasons for German-or Japanese-mon-
etary authorities to hold dollars in excess of any obvious need seem to be connected with 
industrial and foreign trade policy. 
Official foreign currency reserves rise if the monetary authorities of a country peg their 
own currency below the equilibrium exchange rate, which means that the price of foreign 
currencies in domestic currency is too low. This is by necessity a deliberate policy, because 
it requires an official intervention in the foreign exchange market. It reduces the domestic 
demand for imports and enhances the foreign demand for the country's exports; this 
produces a surplus equivalent to short-term lending to foreigners. The purpose can be to 
maintain excessively high exports and excessively low imports, thus obviating the neces-
sity for the foreign trade sector to adjust, which might include a painful restructuring. In 
the long run such a policy does not make much sense. 
If there is an analogy between the case of West Germany accumulating dollars and 
Slovenia accumulating dinar balances, as Hocevar wrote in his letter to me, the latter has 
to be explained along similar lines. Since Slovenia belongs to the same "currency area" 
as the rest of Yugoslavia, there is no separate Slovene monetary authority that could 
intervene in order to keep the value of the dinar in Slovenia below the value of the dinar 
elsewhere. The instigation to acquire dinars from the rest of Yugoslavia would have to 
come from the public in the form of a demand for higher cash balances, in line with the 
rises in both dinar and real incomes. But, as has been pointed out, the demand for cash 
balances is presumably covered by monetary issue and, in an inflationary period, this 
demand will in all probability be held low, for fear that dinar balances would be losing 
value as time passes. 
A possibly higher income elasticity of demand for cash balances could explain a part 
of the rise in the holding of dinar cash balances in Slovenia, but it most certainly cannot 
explain an excess of Slovene exports over Slovene imports if this amounts to as much as 
21 % or even 14% of the Slovene GSP. As far as I am aware, there is no way for the rest 
of Yugoslavia to force cash balances on Slovenia. If non-Slovene enterprises are badly run, 
incur deficits and cannot pay their debts, this deficiency cannot possibly take on the form 
of raised Slovene cash balances, because it is precisely cash balances that the badly-run 
enterprises lack. Inversely, an enterprise that transfers cash in this way completes a legal 
transaction, since the dinar is legal tender. If the Slovenes are in fact left with cash balances 
they do not want, this can only happen because for some reason they do not use them to 
buy goods from the rest of Yugoslavia. The reluctance to spend cash would have to be very 
strong since, at a time of high inflation, the incentive to get rid of cash is overwhelming. 
I can think of only one way-albeit a not very convincing way-to explain the Slovene 
reluctance to use cash balances for buying goods and services. An exchange rate deter-
mines the real relationship between incomes in two countries, especially wages, in view 
of their important share in total incomes and hence also in costs. As a consequence, price 
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levels in the two countries can be kept in line with costs and with each other by altering 
the exchange rate. In the same currency area a manipulation of this kind, using the 
exchange rates, is impossible by definition, so that incomes in various regions- if their 
levels of productivity vary - have to be in line with levels of productivity, to keep the 
regions' prices at the same level and therefore competitive. Judging by the figures that are 
generally known, it is very probable that "personal incomes" in Slovenia are relatively low 
compared with Slovene productivity, whereas they are relatively high in some other 
regions. This relationship would mean that the prices of some goods produced outside 
Slovenia could be on the high side, and vice-versa. But would sellers of highly-priced 
goods not be forced to lower their prices, in view of any difficulty in selling them at cost 
price, and to sell them at a loss? And again: is it possible that anybody, under the present 
circumstances in Yugoslavia, would retain cash balances and not buy goods unless they 
were outrageously overpriced? 
It must be further pointed out that the variation in the relationship between levels of 
productivity and wages is the main explanation of why there are considerable differences 
in the rates of unemployment among the various parts of Yugoslavia. At the margin, wages 
become higher than labor productivity, so that additional workers are not taken on in spite 
of otherwise general financial indiscipline. 
In conclusion, I should emphasize that the figures indicating an increase in the money 
supply in Slovenia hardly corroborate the calculation of a sizeable transfer of wealth from 
Slovenia to the remainder of Yugoslavia on the basis of incomplete current balance 
statistics. If they did, the intriguing question would remain as to why the Slovenes transfer 
real wealth in exchange for dinar cash balances, since nobody can possibly force them to 
do so. 
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I. The paper by Toussaint Hocevar to which this article refers was published under the title 
"Interregional economic integration: the Yugoslav case" in 1985, cf. his bibliography in this 
volume, item 96. 
2. In this article 'billion' is used in its general European meaning, viz., 1,000,000,000. 
POVZETEK 
onTOK BLAGA IZ SLOVENIJE 
Toussaint Hocevar je skusal izracunati odliv blaga iz Slovenije v druge jugosloval1ske republike na 
podlagi poveCC/1~ia denarnih sredstev v slovenskih rokah v en em letu. Ta metoda ne more privesri k 
sprejem/jivemu rezulraru, ker odliv po eni srral1i prerirava, po drugi pa podcenjuje. Podce,~juje, ker 
je odliv 1Il0goc brez poveCal1ja gorovine; prerirava, ker oCill1o vsako poveCC/11ie dellamih vlog Ili 
posledica prenoSli blaga ali IIslug. Sploh je \prasC/1~ie, ~akaj naj bi Siovenci nabirali gotol'ino, ki v 
inflaciji hirro izgllb/ja vredllosr, nall1esro da z ,~jo kllp!io blago ali IIsluge \' drugih delih Jilgoslal'ije. 
